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Introduction
Alas in its beginnings microcredit mostly referred to small uncollateralized loans to the poorest of the poor offered via group-lending contracts by a solidarity organization, currently the market for microcredit involves much more heterogeneous contract terms and composition of lenders and borrowers. This shift can be attributed to the significant and increasing presence of commercial banks in the market, alongside and/or competing with specialized microfinance institutions and NGOs. Commercial banking has arguably created new balances in the mission of microcredit by combining two previously separate institutional logics, e.g. a development logic guided towards helping the poor and a banking logic requiring profits to support operations, see Battilana and Dorado (2010) . On this, using a privileged data set from the Microfinance Information Exchange and not by commercial microfinance institutions, and attribute most of this discrepancy to the cost structure of both organizational types. Hermes and Lensink (2011) further claim that the presence of microfinance banks in the market may even put pressure on social-driven microfinance institutions to reduce interest rates and agency costs, and increase efficiency.
The interest of commercial banks in microfinance is been reported to be motivated by the expected profitability of microcredit loans, the existence of government regulations requiring microcredit lending by the commercial banking sector, the opportunity for the bank to show its corporate social responsibility [Hermes and Lensink (2011)] , and the loss of clients for traditional banking services to bigger international banks [Schicks (2007) ]. The process by which commercial banking institutions enter the microcredit market, while still primarily offering traditional banking 1 Reference, for instance, Yunus (2007) .
products, is commonly referred as "downscaling". Commercial bank downscaling into the microcredit market requires organizational adjustments intended to more efficiently originate and service debt to a very specific population of borrowers that are not traditional bank customers. This is typically done by creating a specialized internal unit within the bank, outsourcing micro-lending operations to an external organization, or by creating a regulated subsidiary. In this paper we analyze the debt origination process in which a lender offers prospective borrowers a microcredit product alongside a traditional bank loan product and the impact antiusury rates on loans can cause in this credit market. This is a paper about the prospects of A result of the model is the possibility to obtain an equilibrium where all opaque borrowers, regardless of their true riskiness, will be rationed from credit in an economy where usury rates are exogenously set too low by regulatory authorities. Were the anti-usury mandate was relaxed, these borrowers would have the option of financing through microcredit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical model used for analysis. Section 3 contains a numerical exercise where the calibration of a model economy is presented and analyzed. Section 4 concludes, and an technical Appendix is included at the end of the manuscript.
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We consider a competitive credit market populated by a large number, F of borrowers and a large number L lenders. All agents are risk-neutral. Each lender is endowed with one unit of financial resources. Each borrower is endowed with a project that needs one unit of finance and delivers R if the borrower is successful and zero otherwise. Lenders' opportunity cost is γ. We consider the case in which, L/F > 1, so that there is abundancy of financial resources.
Lenders offer lending contracts characterized by a cost of credit r and an amount t of application processing time, so that a contract is generally defined as C = {r, t}.
Borrowers are heterogeneous along two dimensions: riskiness, ρ, and Informational transparency, τ . We have risky (R) and safe (S) borrowers -so that ρ = (R, S), opaque (O), and transparent
Borrowers' type is decided by nature: ρ equals S with probability π and R with probability 1 − π, while τ equals T with probability λ and O with probability 1−λ. The payoff of a financed borrower of type θ as a function of a lending contract C = {r, t}, where r is the cost of credit, and t is the amount of time that the lender takes to process the loan application is
in present value terms in case of success, and zero otherwise. We assume that borrowers of type R have a lower probability of success than those of type S: p R < p S . Accordingly the expected payoff for a financed borrower of riskiness ρ is
Lenders can acquire an informative signal s = R, S about the true riskiness of a perspective borrower at a cost c > 0. The signal s has the following probabilistic structure. Given the true riskiness, ρ, of a borrower, the signal s is correct, i.e. s = ρ, with probability σ ρ,ρ and wrong,
i.e. s = ρ, with probability 1 − σ ρ,ρ , where σ ρ,ρ is assumed to be an increasing function of t: The longer the lender takes to process a loan application, the more time the lender has got to acquire information about the borrower, which results in a better signal. We assume that acquiring a signal requires more time in the case of opaque borrowers as opposed to the case of transparent ones. Accordingly, we specify banks' screening technology as follows:
where t T < t O . Note that having observed a signal s = S, the conditional probability that the borrower is S is:
Similarly, having observed a signal s = R, the conditional probability that the borrower is R is:
The signal is informative if:
where P r(ρ) is the unconditional probability that borrower's riskiness is ρ, with P r(ρ = S) = π.
Accordingly, given symmetry, i.e. σ RS = σ SR , and σ SS = σ RR , a signal is informative, i.e. P r(ρ|s = ρ) > P r(ρ), if
Note also that the signal is mis-informative, i.e. P r(ρ = j|s = j) < P (ρ), j = S, R, if:
Finally, the signal is uninformative if
Given the above, we assume that
Finally, we assume adverse selection, in that only borrowers' of type S are worth financing:
Given perspective borrower's transparency, we call a microcredit loan, a contract C characterized by a waiting time lower than t τ . Similarly, we define bank loan, a contract C characterized by a waiting time greater than t τ .
Lender's expected profits
Given a gross interest rate on leding r, the expected profits of a lender that only offers bank loans, conditional on a positive signal, s = S, are given by u B ≡ p B r − c, where
is the probability of repayments on bank loans. We assume that the screening technology is strictly profitable in the sense that p B R − c > γ.
The expected profits of a lender that offers microcredit loans, i.e does not acquire meaningful signals about borrowers' riskiness is given by u M ≡ p M r, where
is the probability of repayments on microcredit loans. We assume p M R > γ so that there exist values of r such that a microcredit loan is profitable to lenders. Note that, for any given r, u B > u M holds for c small enough, since σ > 0.5 and p R < p S .
Note that, since waiting is costly for borrowers, either a financial institution operates as a bank, in which case only lends to borrowers for which the signal is positive, or as a microcredit institution that does not extract any signal. In other words, in equilibrium, lending conditional on a negative signal is ruled out.
Sorting conditions
Lemma 1 (Sorting Condition). Let C M ≡ {r 1 , t 1 } and C B ≡ {r 2 , t 2 } a bank loan and a microcredit contract, respectively., with t 1 < t 2 . Then, other things equal, if a risky borrower prefers C B over C M then, a safe borrower strictly prefers C B to C M .
Proof. See appendix.
Timing and equilibrium concept
An equilibrium in the credit market is pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of the following game:
Stage 1: Lenders simultaneously announce contracts;
Stage 2: Borrowers choose whether to borrow or not and according to which contract;
Stage 3: Lenders decide whether to accept or reject each individual loan application they receive (probably the same as widthdraw the contract);
Stage 4: Exchange, if any, takes place.
In our analysis, we restrict our attention to robust SPNE.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium is a set of a set of strategies for borrowers and lenders and a system of beliefs such that: 1. Agents' strategies are best reply given other at each stage of the game; 2. Beliefs are derived using Bayes's rule whenever possible.
Laissez faire Economy Preliminary results
Lemma 2 (Monotonicity). Let C E the set of contracts played with positive probability in a given equilibrium E. Consider two contracts, C = {r , t }, C = {r , t }, with C = C . Then, if
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the fact that agents' payoff is strictly decreasing both in r and t.
The following result about separation between risky and safe types holds.
Lemma 3 (No separation according to risk ).
There is no equilibrium in which safe borrowers separate.
In a separating equilibrium where all risky borrowers are separated from safe ones, risky borrowers would be unable to borrow as their projects have have a negative expected net present value.
Differently, as competition drives lenders' profits to zero, safe borrowers would be able to borrow at a cost such that they make strictly positive expected profits. But then, risky borrowers would have an incentive to mimic safe ones, which implies that separation between risky and safe borrowers is never an equilibrium. Similarly, in an equilibrium where some of the safe borrowers separate from the rest by applying for bank loans subject to screening, lenders' screening is not a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy: since only safe borrowers are applying for bank loans, lenders best reply is not to screen applicants, which destroys the candidate equilibrium.
Equilibrium characterization
Given lemma 3, the equilibrium candidates are: (a) "Transparency separating equilibria" which transparent borrowers go for banking contracts and opaque ones go for microcredit; (b) "Transparency pooling equilibria" where all borrowers demand either banking or microcredit. We analyze separating equilibria first.
a. Transparency separating equilibria (TSE)
where,
and
The following result applies to the case of Transparent separating equilibria (TSE) Proof. See appendix.
Financial liberalization and emergence of microcredit
In the absence of financial repression, depending on parameter configurations, the credit market finds itself either in a TSE or in a TPE. In a SE, opaque borrowers demand microcredit finance, characterized by a higher interest rates and lower waiting times thank banking loans, which are demanded by transparent borrowers. In a TPE, either all borrowers demand microcredit or the all demand bank loans, depending on parameter configurations.
Consider, however, the possibility that the government imposes an interest rate ceilng, r . The following result holds, Proposition 2. Assume α ∈ (α, α) and R > max(γ/p M , (γ +c)/p B ). If γ/p M > r, (γ +c)/p B < r:
1. In the presence of the interest rate ceiling, the prevailing equilibrium is a TPE, which is unique and characterized as follows: i. All borrowers demand bank loans; iii. The bank contract is C BT = Proof. The result immediately follows from Proposition 1: If α ∈ (α, α) borrowers select a TSE; and the TSE is not feasible because of financial repression, then all demand bank loans, and a pooling characterized by bank loans emerges .
The above proposition says that financial repression in the form of interest rate ceilings affects the equilibrium outcome in the credit market. In particular, interest rate ceilings might prevent the development of microcredit. From a different perspective, financial liberalization policies according to which interest rate ceilings for usury are imposed taking into account the characteristics of each particular credit market, might take the credit market from a pooling equilibrium with no microcredit, where the opaque and impatient borrowers -who are typical customers of microcredit institutions -are rationed, to an equilibrium where lenders offer both loan contract accesible only by transparent borrowers, and microcredit contracts to the opaque ones, who are no longer rationed.
Numerical Exercise
Consider the state space of parameter combinations π, R, γ, σ, β φ for ρ = R, S, where β φ ≡ β tτ -with φ = P, I (P = patient, I = impatient) -and β P = β t T and β I = β t S , p ρ for where a SE exists for this credit economy. 3 Note that, according to the new notation for β, in the rest of this section we are referring to transparent as patient (since they have to wait less to obtain a bank loan) and to opaque borrowers as impatient (since they have to wait more). Define as π * , γ * , R * , t IS and t P R , are respectively identified by the intersection of ICC IS and ICC P R with the interest rate r B .
Simulation Exercise: 2004-2010 Colombian credit market
Although not the primary purpose of the paper, the estimation capacity of the model is tested simulating a real world scenario; this being the Colombian consumer and microcredit loan market 
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
If a risky borrower prefers C B over C M then,
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Consider a separating equilibrium where all safe borrowers separate from risky borrowers: Safe borrowers demand bank loans subject to screening and risky ones demand microcredit contracts.
Lenders' zero profits' condition implies that the cost of credit for risky types exceeds the gross return R. Hence, risky types must not be borrowing and earn zero profits. Similarly, lenders' zero profits condition implies that hte cost of credit for safe types is strictly lower than the gross return R, so that safe types earn a strictly positive payoff. But then, if the cost of credit for safe types is below R, and risky types have always an incentive to mimic.
Consider now an equilibrium inwhich some of the safe separate from the risky, by demanding a banking contract subject to screening. Then, lenders would find it profitable to deviate and not incur the screening cost. But then, all safe will find it convenient to deviate and demand bank loans which destroys the candidate equilibrium.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
First we characterize the TSE. and then discuss existence.
i. Processing time In any TSE, the processing time associated with bank loans supplied to borrower of transparency τ must satisfy, t B = t τ , while irrespectively of transparency, that for microcredit loans must satisfy, t M = 0. The proof is immediate. Consider an TSE equilibrium in which t > t τ for some τ . Then, since t τ is the amount of time lenders need in order to screen applicants of transparency τ , a lender could attract all transparent borrowers and make strictly positive profits by offering a contract characterized by a slightly higher cost of credit and a lower processing time, which destroys the candidate equilibrium. An equivalent argument can be put forward to conclude that t M = 0.
ii. Participation and incentive compatibility constraints Lenders' participation constraints (PCs) are described by the following,
where i = B for bank loans, and i = M for microcredit loans. As for borrowers,
is the participation constraint for a borrower of riskiness ρ when applying for bank loans, with t = t O , t T for bank lonas, depending whether the borrower is opaque or transparent. The PC for borrowers of riskiness ρ applying for microcredit is
Borrowers' incentive compatibility constraints are:
(ICC OR ) :
iii. Cost of credit. Competition among lenders implies that lenders' participation constraints must be satisfied as strict equalities, so that:
Note that σ > 0.5 implies p M < p B so that r B < r M . Given R > 0, borrowers' participation constraints are satisfied so long as γ is sufficiently small.
iv. Existence From the incentive compatibility constraints, we note that, given t > 0, the more stringent constraints are the following
The first inequality is satisfied so long as α ≤ α, and the second inequality is satisfied if α ≥ α.
Accordingly, in order for a SE where transparent are separatated by opaque, the following two conditions need to be satisfied; 1. α > α must hold, which in equilibrium reduces to
and, 2. α must be such that α ∈ [α, α] . Moreover, Note also that γ/p M < R and ((γ + c)/p B must hold in order for participation constraints to be satisfied .
A.4 Proof of lemma 5
We characterize PE in which all borrowers deman bank loans and PE in which all borrowers demand microcredit loans, and then study their existence.
a. TPE with bank loans i. Processing time The same argument as in the case of SE holds that in any PE where bank offer bank loans, t = t T for transparent borrowers, andt = t O for opaque ones.
ii. Participation and incentive compatibility constraints Lenders' participation constraints (PCs) are described by the following, (P C B ) : p B r B ≥ γ
As for borrowers,
is the participation constraint for a borrower of riskiness R when applying for bank loans, with t = t O , t T for bank lonas, depending whether the borrower is opaque or transparent, and similarly, for a safe borrower,
iii. Cost of credit The probability of loan repayment is
Competition across lenders drive their profits to zero, which implies
iv. Necessary conditions for existence Borrowers participation constraints are satisfied so long as R ≥ r B holds. Hence, the necessary condition for the existence of a PE with banking contracts, is R ≥ (γ + c)/p B .
v. TPE with microcredit i. Cost of credit and processing time In a pooling with microcredit, processing time equals zero. Lenders do not extract any meaningful signal. Therefore, Therefore, the probability of loan repayment is
so that, competition among lenders, yields
ii. Necessary condition for existence: Borrowers' participation constraint. Borrowers participation constraints are satisfied so long as R ≥ r M holds. Hence, a necessary condition for existence is R ≥ γ/p M .
iii. Necessary conditions for existence: Microcredit vs Banking Opaque and risky borrowers have the lower expected payoff if applying for banking contracts, which amounts to
. If a microcredit contract were available, their payoff would be, p R (R − r M ).
Hence, if (1−σ)β t O p R (R−r B ) > p R (R−r M ), i.e. if α < α all borrowers prefer banking contracts to microcredit contracts. Safe and transparent borrowers have the highest expected payoff if applying for banking contracts, which amounts to σβ t T p S (R − r B ). If a microcredit contract were available they would earn p S (R − r M ) so that if σβ t T p S (R − r B ) < p S (R − r M ), that is α > α all borrowers prefer the microcredit contract.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a pooling, with bank contracts. Consider a deviation C + M = {0, γ/p M + }, with → 0 + by a lender. So long as,
such deviation would attract safe and opaque borrowers and it will be profitable given the pool of applicants (which is going to include all borrowers, since no lending occurs at the old contract in equilibrium, since the pool of applicants for that contract must have worsened given that safe and opaque go for the new contract. The above inequality reduces α > α. Hence a PE with bank contracts never exists if α > α, and it exists otherwise. Similarly, consider a PE with microcredit contracts. Consider a deviation, C + B = {t T , (γ + c)/p B + )}, where → 0 + . So long as,
then safe and transparent borrowers would be attracted such deviation. Moreover, given the pool of applicants, the deviation is profitable (Note that all borrowers go for this contract since nobody offers loans at the old contract in the subgame since the pool has worsened). The deviation would not be profitable if transparent and safe are not attracted. The above inequality reduces to α < α , and it exists otherwise.
Consider now a separating equilibrium.
